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PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT IN ALASKA:
PROSPECTS AND CONFLICTSt
RICHARD B. NORGAARDtt

Alaska has developed sporadically taking advantage of fur, gold,
and a strategic defense location. Another rush is on. Petroleum development policy has been the major issue in Alaskan politics since
the Prudhoe Bay discovery in February, 1968. Those who favor
widespread economic development hope "black gold" will catalyze a
chain reaction of industrial growth increasing the opportunity for
employment and higher income. Conservationists, on the other hand,
fear the very things developers hope for. If petroleum development
were to bring industry and people to Alaska, soon there would be
little reason to live in Anchorage rather than Los Angeles. The fears
are real; controversies over potential resource-use conflicts due to
petroleum development are raging. But the basis for controversy is
often questionable. Within the limits of uncertainty imposed by the
petroleum industry, the objective of this article is to investigate the
effect of petroleum development on the Alaska economy and
identify the important conflicts between petroleum extraction and
other resource uses.
PROSPECTS
The course of petroleum development in Alaska will depend on
the extent of Alaska's petroleum resources, world demand for
petroleum, United States international trade policies and production
prorationing policies, the world supply of oil, selection of transportation routes and means, and the interpretation of recent and possibly
forthcoming environmental legislation. Because each of these factors
may change with time, the only rigor that can be incorporated in an
analysis of future developments is to state explicitly the assumptions
on which the analysis is based. The sensitivity of Alaska's petroleum
development to changes in these external conditions is also treated
here.
tGiannini Foundation Paper No. 337. Research for this article was conducted during the
summer of 1970 while the author was a member of a Ford Foundation-financed study (A
Survey of Environmental and Land Use Policy Issues in Alaska, Project No. 234-7601) based
at the Institute of Social, Economic, and Government Research of the University of Alaska.
The author is indebted to Arlon R. Tussing and Robert B. Weeden, economist and ecologist,
respectively, of the above Institute; Scott R. Pearson, study member and now with Stanford
Food Research Institute; and David A. Clarke, Jr., Director of the Giannini Foundation of
Agricultural Economics, University of California, Berkeley.
ttAssistant Professor of Agricultural Economics and Assistant Economist in the Experiment Station and on the Giannini Foundation, University of California, Berkeley.
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Supply, demand, and the institutional structure of markets
together determine prices. The real price of petroleum in the United
States has remained relatively constant during the past because
domestic supply and demand have increased nearly proportionately
and oil import quotas and market demand prorationing have been
effectively imposed. Though some institutional changes will no
doubt gradually occur, it is assumed that import quotas and prorationing will continue to stabilize real United States petroleum
prices as they have in the past. A substantial portion of United States
oil is produced, refined, and marketed by large international firms.
These companies tend to shift their producing operations to lower
cost areas. When a vertically integrated company sells its producing
operations in one state and invests in wells in another, the supply of
petroleum in the former does not immediately decrease, but demand
for petroleum in that state by the company that moves does fall.
Thus, there will be an incentive for more restrictive demand prorationing in the old producing area. Given this phenomenon, it is
reasonable to assume that Alaska production will depend upon
whether oil can be extracted and delivered to markets at a lower cost
from Alaska than from other areas. Production levels in Alaska will
be determined by the supply of deposits from which oil can be
extracted at low cost and transport considerations.
PETROLEUM IN ALASKA

A. Cook Inlet
The Cook Inlet Basin is the only area where petroleum is presently
commercially produced in Alaska. About 200 producing oil and gas
wells have been drilled in the Swanson River field on the Kenai
Peninsula and from 14 offshore platforms nearby in Cook Inlet.
Crude oil production during 1969 totaled a little over 74 million
barrels.' Cumulative production from the date of the first discovery
well in 1957 through 1969 amounts to 233 million barrels. In 1969,
149 million cubic feet of natural gas were produced. Reserves in the
presently developed upper Cook Inlet deposits are estimated at 1.7
billion barrels and 10 trillion cubic feet for crude oil and natural gas,
respectively. 2 The value of petroleum produced in 1969 was about
$220 million. During 1969 a second refinery, a natural gas liquefac1. The textual statistics which follow are from Alaska Petroleum Industry Facts, 1970
(unpublished pamphlet on file with the Alaska Oil and Gas Association).
2. D. Blascoe, Feb. 1971 (unpublished Bureau of Mines report to the Fed. Field Comm.
for Dev. Planning in Alaska).
Reserves include only petroleum discovered, developed, and producible with existing
technology and using existing capital already in the field. Reserves are not an estimate of
ultimate production from known deposits.
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tion plant, and a combined ammonia-urea plant began operation near
the city of Kenai. Developments in the lower Cook Inlet have been
slowed by a state-federal jurisdictional dispute and by the recent
industry shift of emphasis to the North Slope. Nevertheless, lower
Cook Inlet might become as productive as upper Cook Inlet.
B. Arctic Slope
The discovery of a very large oil field at Prudhoe Bay in 1968 will
probably shift the center of Alaska production to the North Slope
for several decades. Current production plans are based on the construction of a 48-inch diameter, 780-mile long trans-Alaska pipeline
from Prudhoe Bay to the ice-free port of Valdez on the Gulf of
Alaska. The pipeline proposal has generated considerable controversy
due to expected detrimental effects on the environment. For this
reason, several alternative transport routes and means have been suggested. Further analysis will center around the proposed trans-Alaska
pipeline. The effect on the Alaska economy and the environment of
alternative transportation proposals are considered later in separate
sections.
Initial production plans are to extract 700,000 barrels per day
(255 million barrels per year) as soon as the trans-Alaska pipeline
begins operation. The industry expects to use the full 2 million
barrels per day capacity of the pipeline by 1980 (about 700 million
barrels per year).' The production level will be higher at a later date
if more commercially profitable deposits are found and additional
transportation investments are made. The official estimate of crude
oil reserves in Prudhoe Bay, presently 10-15 billion barrels, will increase as developments on the North Slope proceed.4 Natural gas
reserves in the main pool of the Prudhoe Bay field alone have been
estimated at 26 trillion cubic feet.' This means Prudhoe is also one
of the largest reservoirs of gas in the world. George Gryc (Chief,
Alaskan Geology Branch, U.S. Geological Survey) has estimated total
potentially usable oil reserves on the entire Arctic Slope to be from
50 billion to 150 billion barrels. 6 Similar estimates of the ultimate
natural gas potential have not been made.
3. Current United States production is about 3.5 billion barrels per year. Bureau of
Mines, Dep't of Interior, Minerals Yearbook (1970).
4. Oil and Gas Journal, Jan. 26, 1970. Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) uses the
lower figures.
5. Am. Gas Ass'n, Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids in the
United States and Canada (1971).
6. G. Gryc, Geologic Framework of the North Slope PetroleumProvince, Proceedings of
the Twentieth Alaska Science Conference (Aug. 24-27, 1969).
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C. Other FuturePetroleum Provinces
In addition to Cook Inlet and the Prudhoe Bay area, petroleum
exploration is presently underway on the far western part of the
Arctic Slope near Icy Cape, in Bristol Bay and the Alaska Peninsula,
in the Gulf of Alaska, and in the Nelchina Basin. These areas are very
extensive, and the probability of finding one or more commercially
profitable deposits in the next five years is fairly high. But fields as
large as Prudhoe Bay are rare. The only other known field of similar
magnitude in the United States is the East Texas field which was
discovered in 1930 and from which about 4 billion barrels have been
extracted to date. Less intensive exploration has been occurring in
the Yukon Delta, in the upper Yukon near the Kandik basin, and in
the vicinity of Nenana. At the end of 1969, a total of 11.4 million
acres were under federal or state petroleum lease.
THE COST OF ALASKA CRUDE OIL
The refinery gate price for medium gravity crude oil in Los
Angeles is currently about $3.25 per barrel. Production cost estimates have been made by Arlon Tussing for Cook Inlet and the
North Slope of 40-50 cents and 24-44 cents per barrel, respectively. 7
Tussing's estimates of North Slope production costs may be too high.
Data supplied by Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) suggest production costs of 10-15 cents per barrel. 8 Though transportation costs
7. A. Tussing, The Impact of Oil Import Reforms Upon Alaska's Economy, 1970
(unpublished report on file with the Fed. Field Comm. for Dev. Planning in Alaska)
[hereinafter cited as Tussing].
8. Conversation with Carter Barcus, July 1970. Information provided: (1) wells cost $1
million, (2) wells will have an average initial capacity of 10,000 barrels per day, and (3)
about 400 men will operate the entire field.
Given the above, the development cost per initial daily barrel of capacity is $100. If we
assume a 10 percent rate of return and an 8 percent rate of production decline, then,
according to M. Adelman, Oil Production Costs in Four Areas, Proceedings of the Council of
Economics of AIME, at 26 (1966), the present barrel equivalent is:

I -+ .08
tl
.101

t

50
5.00

Development cost per barrel is, therefore:

$100

5.00 x 365
or 6-8 cents if we allow for dry-hole costs and a higher rate of return.
Operating costs can be estimated by assuming that 400 men cost $200 each per day
(wages, room, board, and transportation plus operating material expenses). Then,
$200
400
(per day per man) x (men per day) = 4 cents per barrel or 4-7 cents to be safe.
2 x 106 barrels per day
Thus, total production costs are 10-15 cents.
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of about 40 cents from Cook Inlet and $1.00 from Prudhoe Bay
must be added to make the Alaska figures comparable to the United
States, it is clear that the exceptional interest in Alaska crude oil
rightfully stems from its low cost.
FUTURE PRODUCTION LEVELS
The discovery during the past decade of deposits which can be
developed at a low cost has raised the hopes of finding more. Exploration effort has increased rapidly since the Prudhoe Bay discovery well. Though discovery and development in other areas are
likely, most of the uncertainty about Alaska production levels during
the next 10-20 years will probably be resolved as development in the
area of Prudhoe Bay nears completion. 9 The best indication of
future production levels would probably be an optimistic projection
of present industry plans. The initial capacity of the pipeline is to be
700,000 barrels per day. If construction is authorized in late 1971,
production would probably begin in 1975. Initially, the 2 million
barrels per day pipeline activity was expected to be utilized by 1984,
but industry spokesmen have indicated that 1980 is now probably a
more realistic estimate. Production of crude oil may occur at a rate
greater than the pipeline's capacity after 1980 if tankers or other
means of transport are introduced. If the pipeline alone were used at
full capacity, it could transport the present estimated level of reserves in about 20 years. Since this reserve estimate is probably low
and there may be other developments on the North Slope, it appears
likely that additional means of transport may be profitable in the
future.
Table 1 presents a rough estimate of upper and lower bounds on
production levels through the year 2000. Since nearly all Alaskan
crude oil will be produced by large vertically integrated firms, it has
been assumed that these firms will find markets for their own
production and that production prorationing in Alaska will not be
necessary in the long run.
Natural gas will be jointly produced at a rate of 1.6 billion cubic
feet per day when production of crude oil reaches the proposed
pipeline capacity of 2 million barrels per day. State law requires that
9. It should be pointed out again that Prudhoe Bay is a very large field, and the probability of finding another field this size is small. Estimates of upper Cook Inlet reserves, for
example, range between 5 percent and 10 percent of present estimates of Prudhoe Bay
reserves, even though development in upper Cook Inlet is nearly complete while that in
Prudhoe Bay has just begun. See note 2 and accompanying test supra. Numerous discoveries
of the order of magnitude of Cook Inlet would have to be made before these new discoveries would be important relative to the still unknown dimensions of the Prudhoe Bay
field.
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this gas must either be marketed or reinjected into the reservoir.
Some gas will undoubtedly be reinjected into the reservoir to aid
subsequent recovery, regardless of marketing possibilities. The
quantity marketed will depend on how present plans for a transCanada pipeline develop or whether other means of transport are
constructed. It is possible that a gas line will be completed soon after
the oil pipeline if oil pipeline construction is delayed beyond 1971
for further environmental evaluation or due to native land claim
conflicts.
How sensitive are the above estimates to changes in the assumptions? What would happen to Alaska petroleum production if
the United States price fell to $2.25 per barrel because the present
restrictions on foreign crude oil were dropped or if demand prorationing in the lower 48 ports were terminated? These questions
have been asked before.'0 It is apparent from the cost data already
presented that development and production in Alaska's two known
petroleum basins will continue even if the price of crude oil falls to
the present world price. Exploration in Alaska would probably decrease, however, and the likelihood that new areas would be brought
into production would be reduced. Compared with production on
the North Slope, on the other hand, production from these additional areas would probably be small for some time to come. Thus,
production would not fall below the lower bound estimate if the
United States price of crude oil fell to the world market level.
The Jones Act requires that cargo transported between United
States ports must be carried in United States-built ships. United
States shipbuilding costs are high. The cost of transporting crude oil
between Alaska and the lower 48 ports, now about 50 cents per
barrel, is perhaps twice what it would be if the Jones Act were
repealed and less-expensive, foreign-built ships were employed. This
shipping cost reduction, at most in the order of 20 cents, would have
a small impact on production levels. Exploration would be
stimulated moderately, and existing wells would produce longer since
elimination of the Jones Act would raise the wellhead price of
petroleum and make it profitable to produce a little longer from
marginal old wells. These effects, however, would be small and do
not provide sufficient reason to increase the estimate of the production level upper bound.
BENEFITS FROM PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT
Alaskans are well aware that petroleum development will change
10. Fed. Field Comm., supra note 7.
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their economy. There is considerable confusion, however, about how

these changes will benefit present residents of Alaska. The objective
of this section is to identify the possible extent of economic change
and the beneficiaries of development.
The major benefit to the State of Alaska will be the rent collected
through the lease bonuses, royalties, and severance taxes paid by the
petroleum industry. The industry pays a 12.5 percent royalty on
wellhead value. The severance tax was recently modified by the State
Legislature from a flat 4.5 percent to a sliding scale ranging from 3 to
8 percent, depending on output per well. Since Alaska wells tend to

have a high output, the average severance tax will probably be about
7 percent. Assuming that the average wellhead price of crude oil will

be about $2.40,'1 then the state will collect 48 cents per barrel in
royalties and severance taxes or nearly $1 million a day when the
pipeline is operating at full capacity. 1 2 The present values in 1972 of

royalties and severance taxes through the year 2000, using an interest
rate of 8 percent, are approximately $2.5 and $4.2 billion for the
lower

and

upper bound total

Alaska

production

estimates,

respectively. If the wellhead price of crude oil fell to $1.50 per barrel
(this would put the Alaska tidewater price at about the competitive
11. This wellhead price is based on an average Alaska tidewater price of $2.90 less an
average transport cost to tidewater of 50 cents per barrel. The transport cost estimate has
been calculated by M. A. Adelman, Significance of Shifts in World Oil Supplies, Proceedings
of the Twentieth Alaska Science Conference (1969), and by Tussing, supra note 7. Adelman
estimated the cost at 45 cents per barrel; Tussing, at 60 cents. Adelman's estimate is lower
because he assumes that the pipeline will start at half capacity rather than quarter and reach
peak capacity after three years of operation. Since the date of Adelman's estimate, one must
also add in the cost of delay and the possibility of higher construction costs due to environmental factors that have been given more serious considerations. The analysis and assumptions presented below indicate that the pipeline capital cost per barrel would be 33 cents or
31 cents based on the lower or upper bound throughput schedules presented in Table 1.
n
QtC
n (1+ r)t K

K-

E
t-1 (1 + r)t

or

C -

t-1
t
where:
C = amortization of pipeline cost per barrel
K = cost of pipeline, including interest to date of initial operation (estimated at $2
billion)
Qt = flow in year t
r = real rate of ret[rn (8 percent was used)
and
n = 25 years.
In addition to C, operating and maintenance costs will probably be 10-20 cents per barrel
due to special problems of operating in Alaska. Adelman indicates that 15 cents was on the
high side.
12. The state collects the severance tax from all wells and receives 90 percent of the
royalties from federally leased land, so this assumption is not particularly critical.
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world level), these values would be reduced proportionately to about
$1.6 and $2.7 billion.
If the assumptions used to estimate the lower bound for future
production levels are realistic, then additional large lease bonus payments are unlikely. The present value of future lease bonuses, given
the assumptions used to estimate the upper bound, is probably of the
order of magnitude of $100 million. Royalties and taxes collected
from future gas production are quite difficult to estimate because of
the uncertainty over when transportation facilities will begin operation. But their present value is also small relative to that of oil. The
present value of all rents collected by the state between 1972 and
the year 2000 will probably fall between $2.0 and $3.5 billion where
the lower bound estimate assumed a $1.50 per barrel wellhead price.
If the $900 million from the September, 1969, lease sale is included,
it is obvious that the present value of petroleum rents likely to
accrue to the state between 1969 (September) and the year 2000 are
sizable. They amount to about $10,000-$15,000 per 1970 Alaska
resident.
The rents collected by the state will be large, but many people
look forward to other substantial benefits from petroleum development. Petroleum development means more jobs and a larger gross
state income. People will be employed to extract, to transport, to
search for more petroleum, and possibly to refine or further process
the product. In addition, people will be employed to provide these
new workers with housing, food, and services. Many Alaskans expect
these indirect effects to provide jobs or better jobs, income or more
income. Development has been promoted as a blessing for all. But on
the average, these expectations will not be realized.
All the anticipated benefits of petroleum development will not be
realized because both the number of permanent jobs and the probability that an Alaska resident will be hired for any individual job are
small. Exploration, development drilling, and pipeline construction
will employ many but for only a relatively short time. Peak
petroleum-related employment in Alaska began in 1969 with extensive exploratory drilling prior to the September lease sale and may
end in a few years with the completion of the proposed pipeline.
Table 2 presents employment data from 1965 to 1970.
ARCO and British Petroleum Alaska, Inc., expect to operate the
Prudhoe Bay field with a total work force of about 400 in the
field. 1 3 This number is low because highly automated equipment is
13. Conversation with Geoffrey Larminie, Area Manager, British Petroleum Alaska, Inc.,
July 1970. Workers would work two weeks on the North Slope and then return to Anchorage or Fairbanks for one week; thus, 600 persons will, in fact, be operating in the field.
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both cheaper and more reliable in the northern environment. Exploration and development work will, of course, continue but on a
reduced scale; and there will undoubtedly be a few smaller North
Slope producing operations. Operation of the proposed pipeline and
tank farm at Valdez will require only about 200 workers.' The
proposed combination refinery and electricity generation plant at
Fairbanks will be sufficient to supply the interior region for many
years to come. About 100 persons will be employed at this plant.' s
No other city along the proposed pipeline route is large enough to
justify another refinery. Table 3 provides estimates of future employment related to Prudhoe Bay.
TABLE 3
Projected Employment of Prudhoe Bay Development and Production; Construction
and Operation of the Proposed Pipeline; and Construction and Operation of
the Proposed Refinery-Power Plant

Exploration, development,
and construction
Operation
Administration

1970-71

1972-73

2.4
0
0.3

10.0
0.2
0.3

Employment
1974-75 1976-77
1,000
5.3
0.6
0.3

0.7
0.9
0.3

1978-2000

0.1
0.9
0.3

Total

2.7
10.5
6.2
1.9
1.3
Source: A. Tussing, G. Rogers, V. Fischer, R. Norgaard, G. Erickson, Alaska Pipeline
Report, Table 26 (U.S. Dep't of Interior, 1971).

Since the vast majority of oil and gas that is now or could be
produced in Cook Inlet is still available for primary processing, there
is little reason to expect an influx of refineries and chemical industries with the start of production on the North Slope. In addition,
processing industries are not likely to be labor intensive; the liquefied
natural gas plant, prilled urea plant, and refinery on the Kenai
Peninsula together currently employ only about 200 persons.
Further and substantial development of a petrochemical industry in
Alaska is possible but unlikely because there is little demand for
chemicals in Alaska and because crude oil is generally cheaper to
transport than chemicals.
Since Alaska imports a large portion of its goods and services from
the "lower 48," the number of jobs associated with serving the
14. Conversations with A. Morel, Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (now Alyeska Pipeline

Service Company), Aug. 1970.

15. The payroll has been generously estimated at $2 million by the plant promoters,
Alaska Energy Company, a subsidiary of Earth Resources Company. Fairbanks Daily News
Miner, Feb. 19, 1970. The number employed was estimated from this figure.
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households of industry workers or supplying the industry directly
with materials is also small. The population of Kenai and Soldotna
increased from less than 1,000 in 1960 to about 5,000 in
1970-mostly because of the Cook Inlet petroleum development. In
1971 there are indications of population loss in the area. The increase of 4,000 persons in 10 years suggests that about 1,500 jobs
were created for all reasons. But employment growth due to Prudhoe
Bay production will not be proportionate to that in Cook Inlet
because of the high output of Prudhoe Bay wells and the automated
equipment that will be used. It is not very likely that total Alaska
petroleum industry employment will be more than 5,000 after
Prudhoe Bay development and means of transport are completed.
Employment will probably decline moderately after production
begins and then rise slowly as production increases over time and a
few new processing industries begin to operate. When production
begins, jobs will tend to be more permanent and year-round.
To the extent that presently unemployed Alaskans receive the
permanent jobs associated with production and transportation of
North Slope crude oil, Alaska's economy as a whole will benefit. But
Alaska is a small part of the larger United States economy. Alaska
has a labor force of about 100,000 persons, but "$ 100 away" in the
Seattle area there exists a labor force of 1 million persons, many of
whom are unemployed or looking for a better job. People in the even
larger California labor force can fly to Alaska for a little more than
$150. Anyone in the entire 80 million United States labor force can
fly to Alaska for $300 or less. In some sense, the entire 80 million
labor force will be competing for the 1,300 new permanent jobs
resulting from Prudhoe Bay extraction, pipeline transportation, and
the Fairbanks refinery. Alaskans are a very small part of the total
United States labor force; they have a competitive edge in that they
do not have to pay the monetary and psychic cost of moving. But
the number of unemployed Alaskans who acquire jobs or employed
Alaskans who find better jobs due to petroleum development will be
much smaller than 1,300. Since 70 percent of the present Alaska
labor force was born outside Alaska, competition1 from new residents
should not be surprising to the present residents. 6
Petroleum extraction employment in the lower 48 has declined
substantially since its peak in the mid-1950's. Many workers in the
Gulf Coast states have experience in the petroleum industry that
16. Less than 30 percent of resident males, including natives, between 20 and 69 in 1960
were born in Alaska. U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population, 1 Characteristics
of the Population, pt. 3 (Alaska) § D (Detailed Characteristics) (1963).
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they are unable to put to work. Employment in Alaska petroleum
fields can mean a rise in income, and these workers will be willing to
pay their transport costs. On the other hand, very few Alaskans have
acquired comparable experience. Workers will come into Alaska as a
result of oil development, population will increase, but per capita
income exclusive of rent received by the state will not necessarily rise
nor will the unemployment rate decrease due to higher levels of
petroleum extraction.'
Because Alaskans must compete with millions of non-Alaskans for
employment in Alaska, it is clear that any action by the state to
encourage industrialization- for example, with a primary processing
law-will have an insignificant impact on the employment of present
Alaska residents. It may not be so obvious, however, that any
primary processing requirement for the petroleum industry that must
be enforced by the state would significantly reduce future lease
bonus, royalty, and/or severance tax payments. If processors do not
now choose to locate in Alaska, it is because construction, operation,
and transport costs are higher. If the petroleum industry were forced
to process its product in Alaska, these higher costs would have to be
paid. The wellhead price of crude oil is the finished product price
determined in markets outside Alaska, less transport and processing
costs. If these costs increase because of a primary processing requirement, the wellhead price will fall. With a lower wellhead price, future
lease bonus payments will be smaller. And since extraction costs rise
over time on any given deposit, a lower wellhead price means extraction will become uneconomic and will be terminated at an earlier
date. The state then loses the royalties and severance tax on the
petroleum not produced. The benefits of forcing Alaska processing
on the petroleum industry would be small; the costs paid by the state
could be quite large.
Like reasoning applies to methods of transporting oil and gas.
Movement to port by rail or motor truck is technically feasible and
would create more employment per barrel or per million cubic feet
than would pipelines. Even in the doubtful instance that the price of
oil or liquefied gas would support highway or rail tariffs, however,
the employment gain to Alaska would be outweighed by the direct
loss of revenues attending a lower wellhead value. The cost advantage
between an "all Alaska" oil 15ipeline, plus marine tankers to the West
Coast ports, compared with an all-pipeline route through Canada, is
17. Conceivably, state per capita income might rise slightly due to an influx of skilled
petroleum workers, which could increase the mean skill level in Alaska. But the incomes of
previous Alaskans would, on the average, still remain about the same.
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not clear. But if the latter route resulted in even a few cents' advantage at the wellhead, this difference would be more important to
Alaska's economy than the relative loss of employment.
In summary, if the state's goal is to increase the welfare rather
than the number of Alaskans, the rent from the petroleum deposits
collected in the form of lease bonus, royalty, and severance tax
payments is the central benefit to Alaska from petroleum development.
The comparable benefits to the United States as a whole will
consist of the rent collected by the State of Alaska, plus the profits
earned by those companies or individuals who hold leases on the
North Slope before the 1968 discovery, less the rents lost by owners
of petroleum deposits in the lower 48 where production would be
relatively lower. It would appear that the developments in Alaska
will put the experience of lower 48 oil extraction personnel to better
use; but, in fact, Alaska oil will replace some production from other
states, and total employment will decline somewhat in the United
States industry due to the higher productivity of Alaska wells.
CONFLICTS
A. Wilderness Preservation
If the petroleum industry paid all of the costs of its operation in
Alaska and captured all benefits through oil and gas revenues, the
rents collected by the state would be a net gain to the state. However, some of the costs of petroleum development are paid by the
wilderness enthusiast who loses a wild area, by the hunter who finds
the stock of game has been reduced, and by the resident of Anchorage who thought the city used to be just the right size. On the other
hand, there will be spillover gains to some residents who perceive
improved opportunities for outdoor recreation because of access to
new country or who value the increase in urban amenities attending
population growth. Though they are difficult to quantify, these costs
and benefits are real. The objective of this section is to define some
of these resource-use conflicts and to evaluate existing institutions
for minimizing them.
Probably the greatest and definitely the most irreconcilable resource-use conflict in Alaska exists between petroleum development
and wilderness preservation. Wilderness is becoming increasingly
scarce. At the same time, per capita income is rising, and more and
more persons can afford to travel to undeveloped areas. In addition,
people who live in developed areas are putting an ever higher value
on knowing that some undisturbed areas still exist regardless of
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whether they will ever see them. Coal, hydro and nuclear power
are substitutes for petroleum. As technology advances, there will be
more. But there are no substitutes for wilderness nor, by definition,
will new technology ever produce any. The decision not to preserve a
wild area is irreversible. The rising value of wilderness, the increasing
availability of energy substitutes over time, and the flexibility of the
preservation option should all be considered when the demand to
develop a wild area arises.
The area that is being developed on the North Slope was wilderness before the petroleum industry came. The trans-Alaska pipeline
will cross the Brooks Range and divide the largest United States
wilderness in two and, via the pipeline access road, provide opportunity for development that could spread east and west. The cost of
not invading the North Slope would have been the several billion
dollars of rent foregone by the state less the rents that would be
retained by producers of the lower 48 states. 1 8 The cost of not
invading the Brooks Range would have been the extra delay, extra
transport cost, and possibly extra risk of transporting petroleum by
tanker from Prudhoe. There is also another alternative to the transAlaska pipeline; those who value wilderness may prefer a pipeline
along the North Slope, through the Arctic Wildlife Range, and across
the wilderness of Canada rather than over the Brooks Range.
When and how was this conflict resolved in favor of development
on the North Slope and in favor of the proposed transport routes?
How will similar conflicts be resolved in the future? Geophysical and
exploratory well drilling equipment was first moved onto the North
Slope in 1944 when the U.S. Geological Survey began exploration on
Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4. This decision was made by the Department of Defense at a time when concern for wilderness was at an
ebb and for more than the immediate future was uncommon. The
alternatives were not considered.
Between 1958 and 1966 the Bureau of Land Management made
available for noncompetitive lease sale a total of 20 million acres
between the Naval Petroleum Reserve and Arctic Wildlife Range and
18. Conservationists argue that there are other benefits from not developing North Slope
oil-that is, we are using too much oil now, our supplies are being depleted too rapidly, and
we are emitting too many pollutants from hydrocarbon combustion into the air. The first
point assumes that technology will not continue to advance and find energy substitutes (and
it may not). The second assumes that North Slope production will have a significant effect
on total consumption of petroleum in the United States. It was pointed out earlier, however, that the major effect will be a shift in the location of production from inferior to
superior deposits; Air pollution is serious; and new, stronger, and pervasive policies will have
to be instituted to solve the problem. These policies, if they were in effect, might affect the
decision to develop North Slope oil; but not developing North Slope oil will have little
effect on our air pollution problem.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 12

an additional 4 million acres west of the petroleum reserve. The areas
selected and timing of these sales were largely determined by industry interest in the North Slope. The decision to lease or not lease
an area depends on the timing and availability of other public land
throughout the United States and political factors. The final decision
is made in Washington and published by the Secretary of the Interior
in the Federal Register. The Environmental Policy Act now requires
the Bureau of Land Management to make an evaluation of the broad
environmental impact of decisions, such as opening new acreage to
oil and gas leasing.1 The effect this requirement will have on the
decision to develop or not develop would probably be marginal if it
were not for the fact that it provides those who favor preservation
with the opportunity to challenge the evaluation, and thereby the
decision, in the courts.
Alaska was granted upon statehood the right to select 104 million
acres from the unreserved public domain. Due to interest in
petroleum development on the North Slope, the state selected nearly
4.5 million acres north of the Brooks Range. About 1.3 million acres
were leased competitively by the state between 1964 and 1969,
including 146,147 acres which are offshore. Since the area of wilderness compared to the number of citizens is large in Alaska, the state
has never selected land from the public domain in order to assure
that it will be preserved in a wild state. This is probably rational
behavior for the state in spite of the growing interest in wilderness
preservation among Alaskans, but it can clearly present serious conflicts with the national interest. 2 0 State selection implies use in the
near future, and the state will probably select all land with petroleum
development potential that the federal government has not already
set aside as a national park, wildlife refuge, military reserve, or other
reserved use. It is clear that, given the present institutions and
attitudes, wilderness will always succumb to petroleum development
whenever industry shows an interest and the state can select the land.
A pipeline was selected by some oil companies as the most feasible
means of transporting petroleum from Prudhoe Bay. The companies
selected Valdez as a terminus because it was a good ice-free port and
considerably easier to reach than Seward or a suitable alternative in
Cook Inlet. The industry then went to the Bureau of Land Management and asked permission to build the pipeline on the route they
had selected. The formal opportunity for public agencies to become
involved in the question of transporting oil from the Slope did not
19. Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 91 Stat. 190 (1969).
20. In 1969 the state selected acreage in the Wood River-Tikchik Lake area which the
National Park Service had proposed for national park status.
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arise except in the form of having the choice of approving or denying
this specific request. The many issues with respect to transport
means and routing versus wilderness values, wildlife, recreation, and
marine resources were not discussed at an early stage. With time it
has become increasingly apparent that there are other alternatives: A
pipeline through Canada, which is likely anyway; tankers, which will
probably be used to a small extent also; and submarine tankers,
which are still in the development stage. Given this range of alternatives, it is unfortunate that the question of when and whether
North Slope oil is produced still rests legally on the engineering and
environmental problems of only one narrowly defined transport
option. In the course of hearings in February and March, 1971, on
the Interior Department's environmental impact statement, Department spokesmen promised an examination of the full range of alternatives to the specific pipeline proposal.
The preservation-development conflict, on the other hand, is not
as great as wilderness enthusiasts have imagined. Conservationists
have accepted developers' beliefs that many more deposits of
Prudhoe Bay size will be discovered, thousands of miles of roads will
be built, refining and chemical industries will become established and
others will follow in their wake, thousands of jobs will attract a
larger population, and everyone will be richer and able to afford to
invade the remaining wild areas. These beliefs were considered earlier
and were found to be unrealistic. Given the quality of petroleum
deposits in Alaska, petroleum extraction generates far greater rents
per unit of area developed than any other resource extraction
activity.
B. Marine Oil Spills
Those who view a clean ocean as the basis for a sport and commercial fishery, a habitat for waterfowl, a necessary adjunct to a
beach, or as an important and life-giving natural area see the
petroleum industry as the great despoiler. Tankers and offshore wells
have spilled phenomenal quantities of oil on the world's oceans
during recent years. The industry has made its impression. Large
portions of the public are understandably outraged. This is the
second major area of resource-use conflict with respect to the
petroleum industry in Alaska.
Tankers presently haul most of the production from Cook Inlet to
the lower 48 states. Small oil slicks are spotted frequently in Cook
Inlet but are short lived due to the strong tidal action in the Inlet. It
has been estimated that approximately 17,000 barrels per year are
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spilled in the Inlet without obvious and important short-term
effects.' ' The long-term effect of this level of pollution has not been
determined. Slop oil and dirty ballast water dumped from one or
more tankers off Kodiak Island in late January, 1970, were apparently the source of Alaska's largest oil spill. A summary report by
the Federal Water Quality Administration notes that at least 10,000,
and possibly as many as 100,000, birds were killed; crab and shrimp
fishermen found that their floats and lines were coated with oil; and
the slick encroached upon 1,000 miles of shoreline along the eastern
side of the Kodiak Islands, Alaska peninsula, and Montague Island in
Prince William Sound.2 2 Though this is the largest oil spill in Alaska
to date, it is comparatively small. With offshore production occurring
in Cook Inlet and likely to occur in the Beaufort Sea, Bristol Bay,
and the Gulf of Alaska and with 2 million barrels of oil per day being
transferred from the pipeline to tankers at Valdez and then shipped
south along the coast, it is a statistical certainty that numerous small
and several large spills will occur in the future. The offshore and
ocean transport operations of the petroleum industry will impose
damages on other users of the ocean and society at large.
Good legislation can force the industry to reduce this conflict.
Present state water quality standards for Valdez harbor require that
there be no visible pollution. But this regulation will only be enforced by the Commissioner of Health and Welfare if the administration finds that enforcement is expedient at the time. The Federal
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 forces the petroleum industry to pay the cost of oil spill cleanup up to $14 million or the
entire amount if willful misconduct can be shown. 2 In addition,
federal agencies are now preparing to initiate emergency clean-up
action whenever an oil spill occurs. The new legislation, however,
does not provide for an assessment for damage which cannot be
restored.
C. Wildlife
To date, petroleum development has only had a small effect on
the ability of wildlife agencies to manage the traditionally managed
species-that is, big game. The Swanson River field, which is a part of
21. P. Kinney et al., Quantitative Assessment of Oil Pollution Problems in Alaska's Cook

Inlet 7 (Inst. of Marine Sciences, Jan. 1970).
22. Fed. Water Quality Ad., U.S. Dep't of Interior, Kodiak Oil Pollution Incident,
February-March 1970 (1970).
For an extensive description of the effects of earlier oil spills, see Evans, Environmental
Effects of Petroleum Development in the Cook Inlet Area, Proceedings of the Twentieth
Alaska Science Conference, (Aug. 24-27, 1969).
23. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 91 Stat. 224 (1970).
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the Cook Inlet basin and located in the Kenai National Moose Range,
has been producing for a decade. The moose seem to be quite indifferent to the petroleum industry. Exploration lease contracts on
the refuge (written and enforced by the Bureau of Sports Fisheries
and Wildlife) have contained several environmental stipulations with
respect to debris removal, erosion control, pollution, and access to
areas where damage to wildlife may be great. In this way the conflict
between petroleum development and wildlife management has been
at least partially eliminated. It has cost the Bureau of Sports
Fisheries and Wildlife one or two supervisory personnel. The cost of
the industry has clearly been larger but, relative to their total operation, the extra cost of the environmental stipulations has been insignificant.
The Kenai Range has traditionally been managed for the benefit of
moose hunters as well as for moose or wildlife in general. Apparently
both the hunters and their prey have enjoyed the improved access
provided by the broad trails constructed by seismic crews. The industry likes to argue that these trails are the reason for the now
larger moose population, but there are several other more plausible
explanations, such as recent fires which have probably increased the
carrying capacity of the range.
On the other hand, those who prefer wildlife refuges to be natural
areas that are left alone will find that the industry has had a substantial impact. An extensive and fine grid of seismic trails crisscross
the refuge. They total more than 2,500 miles.2 4 Broad paths cut
through nearly every stand of trees. Actual production occurs in a
much smaller area which now contains numerous roads, an airstrip, a
topping plant, and several buildings. But this is really the development-preservation conflict and is somewhat independent of a narrow
interpretation of wildlife management problems.
Since caribou do not adapt to the encroachment of civilization as
well as moose, their range on the North Slope will undoubtedly be
reduced by petroleum development. The feeder lines from individual
wells are likely to be the greatest nuisance. The impact of wells,
roads, and feeder lines has been reduced by state-imposed, 640-acre
well spacing2" and the industry's decision to directional drill five
wells from a single drilling pad. Thus, there is only one cluster of
wells for every five square miles. Though the Department of the
Interior pipeline Stipulation K7 requires that the main trans-Alaska
pipeline must not obstruct the migration and movements of big game
animals, 2 6 no one can say for sure how caribou will, in fact, respond
24. Evans, supra note 23.
25. Div. Oil and Gas, State of Alaska, Conservation Order 83-B (Feb. 1970).
26. U.S. Dep't of Interior, Stipulations from Trans-Alaska Pipeline (1971).
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to the above-ground portions of the pipe. Enough is not known
about their migratory patterns to determine quickly whether their
habits will change once the pipeline is built. Presently, plans are to
put the pipe underground except where complications associated
with permafrost make placement above ground necessary.
Section K of the Department of the Interior's stipulations also
provides for a minimum of 300 feet of undisturbed buffer strip along
streams, the protection of spawning beds, the safe passage of
migrating fish, and the protection during construction of areas where
game concentrate, such as nesting areas. In addition, there is a
stipulation that the use of underwater explosives requires a permit
from the Alaska Department of Fish and Game. To the extent that
these stipulations are enforced, the industry will initially bear the
cost of protecting wildlife which the state has "reserved to the
people for common use.'' 2 7
27. Alas. Const. art. VIII, § 3.
Alaskans will bear about one-fifth of any additional pipeline costs since they receive
about this portion in royalties and taxes on the wellhead price of crude oil, which is
determined in part by transport costs.
How expensive can the pipeline be due to extra environmental costs and still ,leave an 8
percent return to North Slope petroleum development? If we assume that the real tidewater
price of crude oil per barrel will remain at $2.90, that production costs are 15 cents per
barrel (see n. 8), and pipeline operating costs are 15 cents per barrel (see n. 11), then $2.75
per barrel can be allocated between royalties and severance taxes and amortization of the
pipeline cost and lease bonus payments.
Let:
K = maximum total pipeline cost
c = amortization of maximum pipeline cost per barrel
B = lease bonuses paid to state
b = amortization of B per barrel
s = severance taxes and royalties per barrel paid to state
r = real rate of return, 8 percent
Qt = flow in year t
n = number of years for pipeline life expectancy, 25 years
2.60 - c + b + s

Z (1+ Qt
r)t K
t=l

b-

(see footnote 11)
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Another game management problem is associated with the introduction of people and, consequently, hunters into areas which previously did not need surveillance. The Alaska Department of Fish
and Game does not feel that any of the big game populations along
the pipeline route will be harmed by additional hunting pressure.
They are concerned, however, that there may be unnecessary killing
of black and grizzly bears, wolves, foxes, and smaller game if they
become a nuisance after being attracted to poorly stored food supplies and improperly disposed garbage. This has been the only problem to date other than the common administrative problems, such as
finding persons hunting without licenses. North Slope petroleum
development has increased the administrative duties and research requirements of wildlife managers in Alaska. Reducing conflicts to the
present level requires several additional men in the field and an airplane. The Alaska State Legislature appropriated $125,000 to the
Department of Fish and Game for North Slope surveillance and research during fiscal year 1970. This figure gives the order of magnitude of Department of Fish and Game expenditures due to developments on the North Slope.
Wildlife managers are also concerned with the possible extent of
effects from a large pipeline oil spill resulting from dislocation of the
pipe stemming from permafrost-related stresses or an earthquake. As
long as the oil stays on land, the impact would be contained and
limited. But a large spill along most portions of the route would
+ 0.20 (2.75) -

nt
E

t=l
K

B

2.05
0.8E (l +
Qtr)

t

08

(1 + r)
Qt

K

2.05 x 5: 66 billion
0.8

- 1.25 billion.
If we let r = 8 percent, n = 25 years, Qt = the lower-bound estimate of flow given in Table
1, and B = $1 billion, allowing for all lease bonus payments and rentals and some North
Slope exploration expenses, then, K = $13.25 billion.
If K did go this high, the present value of royalities and severance taxes paid to the state
would be reduced by 20 percent of the difference in pipeline costs or by 0.20
(13.25 - 2.00) = $2.25 billion.
The same issue has been examined by Tussing, who treats also several institutional factors
influencing the relation between pipeline costs and tariffs. His analysis was written before
the state increased its production tax schedule, hence his estimate of a 16.5 percent loss to
the state for increased pipeline cost. Tussing, Who Will Bear the Incremental Costs of the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline? Anchorage: Federal Field Committee for Development Planning in
Alaska, April, 1970.
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inevitably find its way into a stream and, eventually, one of Alaska's
major rivers-the Copper, the Yukon, the Sagavanirktok, or one of
their large tributaries. Much of this oil would be carried to the highly
productive wildlife habitats in the deltas and estuaries. The damage
to fish and waterfowl could be extremely large. This aspect of the
conflict has hopefully been reduced by the additional pipeline and
permafrost research undertaken during the permit delay.
Alaska state law empowers the Commissioner of Health and Welfare to establish and enforce regulations pertaining to pollution control equipment. 2 With respect to oil pipelines, Regulation 5 1OC I
requires that means for containing the maximum volume of oil that
could be spilled from a pipe must be built. The Department of the
Interior stipulated (Stipulation B 16b) 2 9 that containment areas must
be provided around storage tanks but not the pipeline itself. It would
seem that some spill control devices would be in order in the vicinity
of waterways and especially at crossings. According to Department
of the Interior Stipulation B9, the trans-Alaska pipeline is required to
comply with all state laws and regulations, but the Health and Welfare regulation will only be enforced if the Governor's Office directs
the agencies to enforce this rule. Health and Welfare has not given
any indication that this regulation must be followed.
The Department of the Interior has stipulated (B 16c) that an oil
spill contingency plan must be submitted 60 days prior to the commencement of pumping and that the pipeline company will be
responsible for cleaning up or paying the Department of the Interior
to clean up after any spill. Though damages will not be assessed, a
fine may be levied. Areas will have to be restored to as near the
original condition as possible. The effectiveness of these stipulations
with respect to wildlife and habitat will depend on how strictly they
are enforced.
The Alaska Department of Fish and Game submitted a report on
the pipeline impact on wildlife to the Bureau of Land Management
and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System in 1969. The following is the
summary statement:
If the U.S. Department of Interior, Trans-Alaska Pipeline stipulations are strictly enforced minimum hazards to wildlife population
are anticipated during the construction period.
Increased public access resulting from pipeline construction will
improve recreational opportunity. Increasing input from resource
28. Dep't Health & Welfare Regs. Alas. Stat. § 18.05.040 (1949).
29. U.S. Dep't of Interior, Stipulations for Trans-Alaska Pipeline (1971).
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agencies will be required to monitor growing resource utilization
during the post construction period.
The potential hazards to wildlife will be great during and after the
period of feeder line construction unless arctic engineering technology can be improved. Potential oil pollution from the TransAlaska Pipeline System remains as the greatest single hazard to
wildlife .30
The wildlife issue has received the most publicity. Within Alaska
this may be due to the importance of big game as a means of subsistence or a source of supplementary meat. In the lower 48 states,
Alaska is thought of as the last area where animals have not been
affected by civilization. Perhaps it is merely easier to identify with
caribou than tundra. But wildlife has historically been treated as
special. There is an Alaska Department of Fish and Game which
manages all wildlife except on certain federal lands. There is not an
analogous statewide department to oversee and manage wilderness
or natural areas per se. 3' The basic reason the wildlife-petroleum
development conflict has been well delineated is because there is an
agency to speak for wildlife. The Alaska Department of Fish and
Game has described the problem, provided information to the pipeline company and to the Department of the Interior, and put men in
the field to reduce the conflict. But these actions do not imply that
the conflict has been efficiently resolved. The Alaska Department of
Fish and Game cannot impose the cost of damage from an oil spill on
the petroleum industry so that the industry will minimize wildlife
damage from this source the same as they minimize any other cost.
D. Recreation and Tourism
Alaska attracts tourists because of its wild beauty. Partly in jest
and partly in earnest, conversation in the lower 48 states with respect
to visiting Alaska centers around the "see it now before it's too late"
argument. Few want to visit the most northern major oil-producing
area, to travel a beautiful mountain highway conspicuously bordered
by a pipeline, or view large erosion scars on the slopes above the
road. Whether the tourist ever sees these things or not, Alaska's
reputation has been tainted. The industry has become very sensitive
to this problem. Both ARCO and British Petroleum have spent sev30. Game Div., Alas. Dep't of Fish and Game, Trans-Alaska Pipeline: Specific Ecological
Considerations and Implications for Game Management (1969).
31. Wildlife managers by interest and education tend to be sympathetic toward preservation. As more and more interest has developed in protecting wild areas, wildlife managers
have tried to fill the void resulting from the absence of a wilderness management agency.
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eral hundred thousand dollars cleaning up debris left during North
Slope exploration and experimenting with erosion control and
tundra rehabilitation techniques.3 2 To a large extent, they are correcting mistakes that should not have occurred in the first place and
for which they are not wholly to blame. Nevertheless, they are
definitely putting on white hats and sincerely trying to play goodguy roles.
But regardless of the image of the industry and Alaska's new
reputation, there will be some conflicts in the field between
petroleum and outdoor recreation and tourism. The winter haul
road, pipeline road, and pipeline will traverse the Brooks Range
before the several proposals for Gates of the Arctic National Park
have been considered and the best boundaries, means of access, and
areas to be developed have been selected. Petroleum developments
have limited some of the proposed national park options. Similarly,
the pipe will pass through the proposed Keystone Canyon Scenic
State Park near Valdez. It is not likely that the pipeline path will
enhance the scenery.
It can also be argued that petroleum development and recreation
development are joint products. The pipeline road will open up the
Ray Mountains, the Brooks Range, and the North Slope to tourists,
hunters, and mountain climbers much earlier than if oil had not been
discovered on the North Slope. This argument is also valid, but the
resulting unplanned recreation will be of lower quality.
No agency has studied the petroleum-tourism and recreation conflict. Though there are several agencies that should be concerned
with the problem-such as the State Division of Parks and Recreation, the National Park Service, the Bureau of Land Management, or
the Alaska Travel Division of the State Department of Economic
Development-there is no agency which is broadly conceived, well
financed, and staffed with a research team. Perhaps the new division
status recently given to Parks and Recreation will help this group
begin to meet the need. Given the lack of statewide, coordinated,
and long-range recreation and tourism planning, it is not surprising
that so little has been done about the conflicts between petroleum
development and recreation and tourism.
ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORT ROUTES
This article concentrates on the economic and environmental
aspects of the proposed trans-Alaska pipeline simply because this is
the most likely transport route and means. Other researchers have
investigated the alternatives. These include (1) a trans-Canada pipe32. Conversations with Tom Brennan, Public Relations, Atlantic Richfield Company,
July 1970.
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line to Chicago and on to New York, (2) tankers through the Northwest Passage to New York, and combinations of (3) railroad and
pipeline or (4) airplane and pipline. Cicchetti and Krutilla compared
the trans-Alaska pipeline with alternatives (1) and (2) and found that
the monetary gains of these alternatives were somewhat greater. 3 In
addition, the environmental costs of the trans-Canada pipeline are
likely to be less since the MacKenzie Valley route would probably
have less permafrost problems, definitely little earthquake risk, and
no tanker risk. Quirin and Wolff compared the trans-Alaska pipeline
with alternatives (1), (3), and (4) and also found the trans-Canada
pipeline to be the superior alternative. 3 4 Quirin and Wolff argue in
addition that, given the low North Slope extraction costs and high
market price, it may be economically feasible to fly the oil from
Prudhoe Bay to Valdez or Edmonton. Both of these studies contain
interesting and valuable insights and rough quantification of some of
the environmental costs.
CONCLUSIONS
The State of Alaska will collect between $1 billion and $3 billion
in the form of lease bonus, royalty, and severance tax payments
during the next 15 years. Given that prorationing in the lower 48
states and import controls are maintained, the higher figure is much
more likely. Petroleum development will have an impact on the
Alaska economy. About 750 new permanent jobs will be created
directly by petroleum extraction, transportation, and processing. On
the other hand, the benefits to present Alaska residents will be
minimal since most of these new jobs will be filled by migrants from
the lower 48 states who already have the appropriate skills.
The major conflicts to date and for the foreseeable future seem to
be those between the petroleum industry and (1) wilderness, (2)
marine resources, (3) wildlife, and (4) recreation and tourism. There
are other conflicts, such as air pollution from petroleum processing
and gas flaring, but these conflicts are neither large nor particularly
unique to the industry. Present institutions let the petroleum industry impose these costs on others except where specific corrections
are made. It is interesting to note that the opposite is true in the case
of the fishery or recreation industries which impose few costs and
absorb many.
33. Cicchetti & Krutilla, An Evaluation of the Environmental Impact Statement for the
Proposed Trans-Alaska Pipeline, testimony before the U.S. Bureau of Land Management
(Wash. D.C., Feb. 1971).
34. Quirin & Wolff, The Economics of Oil Transportation in the Arctic, paper prepared
for Conference on Canadian-U.S. Law of the Sea Problems, at University of Toronto
(Toronto, Ontario, June 1971).

